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DIGEST OF CHURCH LAW DECISIONS OF 1939*
This digest is the first annual digest of decisions involving
civil church law to be published by the Bureau of Research
in Educational and Civil Church Law. It includes every
case appearing in eighty-six reporters of the National Re-
porter System which were published in whole or in part dur-
ing the calendar year of 1939. Only cases containing prob-
lems peculiar to churches are included, and those cases which
involve churches solely as litigants are not necessarily in-
cluded.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The problem of religious liberty is of fundamental impor-
tance in any treatment of civil church law. Because numerous
safeguards surround this inalienable right and because the
body of law interpreting it has become relatively stable,
questions involving religious freedom seldom come before
courts of review.
ORDINANCE REGULATING CANVASSING As INFRINGING
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
An ordinance of the City of Jeannette, Pennsylvania,
which regulated the canvassing for or solicitation of orders
within the city, was challenged by members of the sect
known as Jehovah's Witnesses. They had been arrested and
convicted under the ordinance while they were allegedly
preaching the Gospel by calling on people in their homes and
exhibiting to them a message of the Gospel in printed form.
Nothing was decided as to the validity of the ordinance,
which was attacked as interfering with freedom of religion
and of the press, however, and the appeal was dismissed be-
*Included in this digest are all the church law cases foind in the following re-
porters: Atlantic 2d, Vols. 2-9; Federal 2d, 99-107; Federal Supplement, 25-29;
New York Supplement 2d, 8-15; Northeastern 2d, 17-24; Northwestern, 282-288;
Pacific 2d, 84-95; Southeastern, 109-4 (2d); Southern, 184-192; Southwestern 2d,
121-133; and United States Supreme Court Reporter, 59.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
cause those convicted had failed to include in the transcript
on appeal a copy of the conviction and a copy of the ordi-
nance.
1
SALUTING THE FLAG As A RELIGIOUS RITE
In other cases the Jehovah's Witnesses have been more
successful in getting the courts to pass upon the question of
whether their religious freedom had been impaired by offi-
cial conduct. The courts of four different states were called
upon in 1939 to determine whether the religious belief of
such sect was infringed by requiring the children of its mem-
bers to salute the American flag as part of a patriotic dem-
onstration in the public schools. In each instance the salute
was objected to on the ground that its performance was a
form of worship of graven images contrary to the teaching
of the Bible and inconsistent with the religious belief of the
Jehovah's Witnesses.
In the case of Johnson v. Town of Deerfield,2 the Federal
District Court sitting in Massachusetts was called upon to
determine the validity of a statute calling for the display of
a flag in all public schools and a mandatory salute thereof
by all pupils at least once a week. In refusing petitioner's re-
quest for a declaratory judgment decreeing the statute void
as unconstitutional, the court held that it was precluded from
declaring that the salute was a religious rite because of a
previous decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, and because of the action of the Supreme Court of
the United States in dismissing two appeals from state courts
of last resort, involving the same question, on the ground no
substantial federal question was involved. The court fur-
ther held that the right to attend a public school was not an
absolute right, but one subject to such reasonable restrictions
as the law might impose. In reaching its conclusion the court
distinguished the case of Gobitis v. Minersville School Dis-
I Corn. v. Stewart, 137 Pa. Super. 445, 9 A. 2d 179 (1939).
2 25 F. Supp. 918 (1939).
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trict,3 wherein the result was favorable to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, on the ground that the resolution in the Gobitis
Case was contrary to the particular provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, and the resolution was not supported
by enabling legislation as in the instant case.
The Supreme Court of Florida was called upon to decide
a similar issue in the case of State ex rel. Bleich v. Board of
Public Instruction for Hillsborough County,' which was a
proceeding in mandamus to compel the scho61 officials to per-
mit the reentry into the public school of children who had
been expelled because of their refusal to salute the flag.
The court, in denying the petition for mandamus, said that
such a salute was "patriotism in action. It has no reference
to or connection whatever with one's religious belief ...
One is in no sense inconsistent with the other and saluting
the flag does not approach a religious rite. . . . To symbolize
the flag as a graven image and ascribe to the act of saluting
it a species of idolatry is too vague and far fetched to be even
tinctured with the flavor of reason." Two judges dissented
from a denial for a rehearing on the ground that although
they agreed that the school authorities had the power to re-
quire students to salute the flag in patriotic exercises they
questioned whether the school officials had the power to expel
a student who refused. The dissenters felt that some substi-
tute for the salute could have been demanded which would
not have been objectionable, and which would have prevent-
ed the martyrization of students refusing to perform "an act,
not essential to the public welfare or the support of the gov-
ernment."
The New York Court of Appeals indicated sympathy for
the opinion expressed by the dissenting judges in the Florida
case, when they held that saluting the flag was not an act
of worship but they felt that more tact could have been dis-
3 21 F. Supp. 271 (1938).
4 190 So. 815 (Fla., 1939).
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played in dealing with the expulsion of the child.' The case
arose out of the prosecution of the parents of a child of
school age for their refusal to send the child to school as
required by statute. It appeared that the child had been sent
to school as required but on each occasion she had been ex-
pelled because of her refusal to salute the flag. The court
expressly decided that the prosecution was improperly
brought against the parents and by inference decided that
the prosecution would lie against the child if she were in-
subordinate. Judge Lehman, wrote *a separate opinion in
which he concurred in the result of the other judges, but he
challenged the inference in the majority opinion that the
child could be compelled to salute the flag against her moral
convictions. He concluded his stirring defense on behalf of
the child with, "The flag 'cherished by all our hearts' should
not be soiled by the tears of a little child."
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals avoided passing on the
question of the propriety of a mandatory salute of the flag
by all public school pupils on the ground that the question
was moot at the time of the appeal. In the case of Shinn v.
Barrow ' pupils of a public school sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of an order whereby they were suspended from
school because of their refusal to salute the flag as required
by statute. The appeal which was brought after the expira-
tion of the term of the school year for which the pupils had
been suspended was dismissed because the problem had be-
come moot.'
EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF UPON TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF BODY OF DECEDENT
A New York Court in the case of In re Scheck's Estate,
Petition of Kitzen,8 was faced with an interesting legal
5 People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N. E. 2d 840 (N. Y., 1939).
6 121 S. W. 2d 450 (Tax. Civ. App., 1938).
7 It is interesting to note in this case that the court deemed that the plaintiffs
had been dismissed as "incorrigibles" and therefore they came under a statute
which prohibited expulsion of incorrigibles for longer than one term.
8 14 N. Y. S. 2d 946 (1939).
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problem arising out of the following set of facts. The testa-
trix, of the will under construction, provided in her will that
$1,200 should be used for transporting her body to Palestine
for burial. In ignorance of these directions her children had
her remains buried in this country at an expense of $189.33.
The evidence showed that at the time the testatrix made the
provision in her will she was living with her second husband
in Palestine and was making payments on a burial lot there,
but that at her death she was living apart from her husband
and had long ago ceased making payments on the Palestine
burial plot and had purchased a cemetery lot in this coun-
try where her remains were interred. The somewhat equivo-
cal testimony of two Rabbis was to the effect that a disin-
terment would be contrary to Jewish Tenets and Hebrew
Laws. Nothwithstanding all of this testimony the court de-
nied the petition of the distributees of the estate that the
body be allowed to remain in this' country, since the inten-
tion of the testatrix seemed to continue and the result sought
by the distributees would greatly increase the amount of dis-
tributable assets of the estate available to the petitioners.9
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE LACKING RELIGIOUS CEREMONY
An annulment of an unconsummated marriage entered in-
to before a Justice of the Peace, was granted at the instance
of the Catholic party in the case of Ruberti v. Ruberti, by
the New Jersey Court of Chancery." From the evidence it
appeared that the petitioning wife had submitted to the mar-
riage'only because of her spouse's promise to have the mar-
riage solemnized according to the rites of the Roman Catho-
lic Church within a year of the first ceremony. The annul-
ment was granted on the ground of the fraud worked upon
the petitioner.
9 The court also passed on a point, not directly concerned in this Digest, when
it said that the disposition of a body in a will is not testamentary in character,
requiring a will to alter it.
10 3 A. 2d 128 (N. J. Eq., 1933, rec'd for publication Dec. 7, 1938).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
RIGHT TO USE PROPERTY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
Comparable to an individual's right to freedom of religious
belief is the right the law accords a man to use his property
for religious purposes. During the year 1939 the courts of
Nevada, New York and Oklahoma passed upon this ques-
tion and in each instance the decision was favorable to the
religious use.
The Supreme Court of Nevada on an original petition
for mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit to erect
a Roman Catholic Church in Reno held that a municipal
ordinance requiring the consent of property owners in a
"residential district" before the erection of a church therein
was invalid as violative of due process of law, and not be-
ing related to the health, public safety, morals, or conven-
ience and welfare of the community." It was carefully point-
ed out, however, that the ordinance was void only as to this
particular church, and no adjudication as to its general
invalidity was attempted.
In Sweet v. Campbell, the Supreme Court of New York
refused to enjoin the erection of an undertaking establish-
ment and funeral chapel and church on the grounds that it
would necessarily be a nuisance.12 The court, of course, re-
served its right to enjoin defendant's establishment if it later
should prove to be a nuisance.
In passing upon the construction of a zoning ordinance
limiting the space to be left between churches and other
buildings the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided that the
ordinance was not to operate retrospectively and therefore
it was not applicable to the church in question.13
RIGHT TO USE PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
The converse of the foregoing proposition as to the use of
one s own property for religious purposes is the highly con-
11 State ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop of Reno v. Hill, 90 P. 2d 217 (Nev.,
1939).
12 9 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (1938).
13 Shaw v. Calvary Baptist Church, 88 P. 2d 327 (Okla., 1939).
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troversial question as to the use of public property for reli-
gious purposes. Only one case involving this problem arose
during the year 1939. It concerned the use by, and loan to,
a Catholic College of the auditoriums in the New York State
Education Building for a lecture to be given by Father Hub-
bard, a Jesuit priest. Such use was held not to be in violation
of the broad prohibition of the New York Constitution
against public aid to denominational schools. 4
DEDICATION OF BUILDING TO CHURCH USES
On the interesting question as to what is required to dedi-
cate a building as a church we find one important pronounce-
ment by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In the case of
Malanchuk v. St. Mary's Greek Catholic Church of McKees
Rocks, Pennsylvania,"0 this court decided that the mere fact
that the ritualism of the Greek Uniate Church was to a cer-
tain extent followed in a particular church, that such did not
amount to a conveyance and dedication of the property to
that church. There must be certain evidences of its submis-
sion to that church's authority, and its dedication as such a
church by prescribed form must be observed, before such
dedication occurs.
LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
A. Kosher Meats
The case of People v. Gordon,"6 involved the prosecution
of a butcher for the sale of chicken which, allegedly, was
falsely represented to be Kosher, in violation of a statute
making such offense a misdemeanor. It appeared that al-
though the statute did not define "Kosher" that the Kash-
ruth Association, a Rabinnical Association, decreed that all
poultry must be marked with a seal or otherwise it did not
14 New York League for Separation of Church and State v. Graves, 170
Misc. 196, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (1939).
15 9 A. 2d 350 (Pa., 1939).
16 14 N. Y. S. 333 (1939); see also People v. Miller, 23 N. E. 2d 556 (N. Y.,
1939).
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conform to the Kosher requirements. In convicting the de-
fendant, who admitted he had sold the poultry without the
seals, which cost a penny apiece from the Kashruth Associa-
tion, the court incorporated the decree of the Association
into the statute, and refused to consider the question of dele-
gation of power and other constitutional questions because
no property rights were involved.
B. Sunday Closing Laws
Religious practices commonly receive recognition and pro-
tection in legislation designed to make the Sabbath a day
of rest. Two Sunday closing laws were involved in litigation
in the year just past. The Supreme Court of Idaho in State
v. Cranston,17 sustained a conviction of a defendant for sell-
ing bread, cheese and butter on Sunday, notwithstanding de-
fendant's contention that times had greatly changed since
the original passage of the law. Faced with a similar prob-
lem the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a conviction of
defendant for selling groceries and meats on Sunday in
violation of a city ordinance, which law was passed under a
proper exercise of the police power of the municipality.18
LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY USED FOR
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
A. Zoning Protection Against Liquor Dispensaries
Since the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment the pro-
tection afforded Churches and schools against liquor dis-
pensaries in the immediate vicinity has become increasingly
important. The Kentucky Courf of Appeals passed upon the
provisions of the Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Law
of 1938 twice in the year 1939. In the case of Beacon Liq-
uors v. Martin," the court held that the statute was con-
17 85 P. 2d 682 (Idaho, 1938).
18 People v. Krotkiewicz, 286 Mich. 644, 282 N. W. 852 (1938).
19 131 S. W. 2d 446 (Ky., 1939).
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stitutional, notwithstanding it excepted from its operation
drug stores, private clubs, and hotels, and irrespective of its
providing that upon the consent of the church or school in-
volved a dispensary could be licensed as against contention
that such constituted an unwarranted delegation of legisla-
tive powers to the school, hospital, and church.
The second case involved the revocation of a retail beer
license on the ground that it was within the restricted 200
feet of a "church or other place of worship." In granting the
revocation the court in Dougherty v. Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board,"0 greatly clarified the law on this
subject. Although the statute used the terms "street or ave-
nue" the court felt that such included country highway.
Within the meaning of the statute a building on a corner was
held. to be on both streets, and since the statute spoke of
""premises" and not "entrances" the closing of a side entrance
on the street upon which the church was situated was of no
avail. In determining the distance between the church and
the restricted business'the court held the measurement should
be made on a direct line from the property lines of each prem-
ise and not by measuring the distance by way of the usually
traveled route. As to whether the building involved was a
"church or other place of worship" the court held that the
building which was formerly a public school and which had
been used for years as a community Sunday school and for
occasional preaching services, was a church within the stat-
ute although there was no general church organization hav-
ing a pastor or board of stewards or deacons or similar offi-
cers.
B. Zoning Restrictions Against Gasoline Filling Stations
In St. John's Roman Catholic Church of Stamford v.
Board of Adjustments or Appeals of City of Stamford,21
the Church appealed from a grant of a certificate to operate
20 130 S. W. 2d 756 (Ky., 1939).
21 125 Conn. 714, 8 A. 2d 1 (1939).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
a gasoline filling station within the restricted area of its
school. In granting the church's appeal the court held that
the defendant Board acted improperly in varying the city
zoning regulations to permit the prohibited business within
the restricted area, notwithstanding the station was eight
feet over the restricted distance from the school building
itself since it was much less than the required distance from
the school property.
TAX EXEMPTION
A. Of Church Property
In the Town of Woodstock v. The Retreat, Incorporat-
ed,-' the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut restricted
the tax exemption afforded church property in that state by
refusing to hold a retreat house for Unitarian clergyman ex-
empt from taxes. The mere fact there was a chapel in the
house did not bring it within the exemption provisions of
the statute since the evidence showed it was simply a place
of temporary sojourn for the purpose of spiritual rest and
refreshment.
The Supreme Court of Maine in the case of Ferry Beach
Park Association of Universalist Church v. City of Saco, -
clarified the position of the petitioning association, which
conducted summer institutes for the purpose of increasing
the missionary power of the Universalist Church, and held
that its property was tax exempt since it was used exclusively
for religious purposes.
B. Exemption from Inheritance Taxes
A New York Court In re Bouvier's Estate,24 ruled, in ac-
cordance with existing authority, that property not left di-
rectly to the religious association was not exempted from in-
22 125 Conn. 52, 3 A. 2d 232 (1938).
23 7 A. 2d 428 (Me., 1939).
24 15 N. Y. S. 2d 111 (1939).
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heritance taxes, and where testator left his nephew certain
sums to be given to named religious beneficiaries, "without
in any way limiting the absoluteness of this bequest," such
sums were not tax exempt even though the nephew dis-
posed of the property as the uncle indicated he wished him
to do in the precatory words of the will.
In San Jacinto National Bank v. Sheppard,2" the Texas
statute exempted taxes on legacies to religious and charita-
ble corporations "located" within the state if used therein,
and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals refused to exempt
from taxation a bequest to "The Christian Restoration As-
sociation," a foreign non-profit corporation chartered in
Ohio, notwithstanding the association had four workers in
Texas.
RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF CHURCH PROPERTY
Even in the absence of an outright schism the right to
possession of particular church property among conflicting
groups frequently comes before the courts. The case of
Malanchuk v. St. Mary's Greek Catholic Church of McKees
Rocks, Pennsylvania,21 required a judicial determination as
to what type of Greek Catholic Church the church in ques-
tion was. From the evidence it appeared that the services
performed in the Church were in accordance with the Ori-
ental services of the Uniate Rite, affiliated with the Pope at
Rome, that at times the pastor was a Uniate priest, that the
church contributed to the Uniate Bishop, but that the con-
gregation had failed to conform to the Uniate Rite in the
matter of dedication of the church and its altars. In holding
that the church was not a church of the Uniate Rite the
court held that the mere celebration of services without any
submission to the authority of the church was insufficient
evidence of its dedication or conveyance to the Uniate Rite.
25 125 S. W. 2d 715 (TEX. CIv. App., 1938).
26 9 A. 2d 350 (Pa., 1939).
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Although a trustee of a church might have a right to pre-
vent an ouster of the congregation from its property a trus-
tee's suit involving facts and defenses similar to those dis-
closed in previous litigation will be dismissed as controlled
by the prior adjudication.
"2 7
In an action to enjoin trespasses upon church property
by defendants who allegedly usurped petitioners' possession
of the church, wherein it appeared that a schism had de-
veloped in the church out of a difference of opinion as to the
interpretation and application of the church's creed, the
Supreme Court of Alabama 28 held that the civil courts were
without jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, and
that in any event the church was a necessary party to the
proceedings whether it was incorporated or not.
Faced with a similar problem in Grantham v. Humphries,29
the Supreme Court of Mississippi dismissed a bill for a
mandatory injunction filed by the former pastor of a Bap-
tist Church, who had "gone Fundamentalist," and had been
excluded from the church. Since such was an ecclesiastical
and not a civil matter the court refused to entertain the bill,
and ruled that the church authorities and their tribunals
were supreme in such matters.
SUCCESSION OF PARENT CHURCH TO PROPERTY
OF SUBORDINATE CHURCH
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of the Ap-
plication of Tyler, Tyler v. German Congregational Church
of Zion of Butte,3 ° ruled that the plaintiff organization failed
to establish by clear and direct evidence that the allegedly
defunct church was under its supervision or control as re-
quired by the statute providing for succession by the parent
27 4 S. E. 2d 827 (Ga., 1939).
28 Bailey v. Washington, 185 So. 172 (Ala., 1938).
29 188 So. 313 (Miss., 1939).
30 283 N. W. 512 (Neb., 1939). Re the status of the property of a subordinate
lodge see the case of Brown v. St. Mary's Temple No. 5, S. M. T. United Brothers
of Friendship of Texas, 127 S. W. 2d 531 (TEx. Civ. App., 1939).
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church to property of the subordinate church upon the lat-
ter's ceasing to exist.
RETURN OF CHURCH PROPERTY AFTER MERGER FAILS
Where it appeared that property had been conveyed to
effectuate a proposed merger of two Jewish corporate con-
gregations the California court ordered a restoration of the
property as originally held before the planned merger fell
through. 1
PROTECTION OF CHURCH'S NAME
To protect the Methodist Episcopal Church, South against
the confusion, etc., which might result the Supreme Court
of Georgia revoked a charter granted a church corporation,
incorporated under the name of "Methodist Episcopal
Church, South, Incorporated."32
POWER OF CHURCHES
In a widely publicized opinion Justice Hooley of the Su-
preme Court of New York held that a certificate of incorpo-
ration was not a matter of right for all churches, and such
certificate would be denied if it appeared that the proposed
religious corporation might tend to glorify qualities which
were the very antithesis of religion irrespective of the incor-
porators' right to freedom of religious belief.3
CHURCH RADIO STATIONS
By inference the federal court in the case of Evangelical
Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and other States v. Fed-
31 Congregation Mukuom Israel v. Congregation Ahabot Israel, 90 P. 2d
118 (CAL. App., 1939)..
32 Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Inc. v. Decell, I S. E. 2d 432 (Ga.,
1939).
33 In re Long Island Church of Aphrodite, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 762 (1939). Upon
rehearing the certificate was granted upon a. showing that the proposed corporation
was not being organized for any other purpose than a religious conception of love,
beauty, and that its practices would not tend to glorify any qualities opposed to
the almost universal conception of religion.
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eral Communications Commission, (Pulitizer Publishing Co.,
Intervener),"4 held that churches could maintain radio sta-
tions, when it said in the course of its opinion, "The public
interest does not necessarily demand that all stations become
commercial, or that none be supported by religious bodies."
ACTS ULTRA VIRES CHURCH ASSOCIATION
Where an association was organized: to advance the
cause of true religion in Maryland and the District of
Columbia by aiding feeble Baptist Churches, to supply desti-
tute neighborhoods with teaching, to encourage the more
general diffusion and reading of the sacred scriptures, and
to provide opportunity of preaching and devotional exer-
cises during the session of the association, the Maryland
court held that it could not accept a testamentary bequest
which was for the purpose of building an Orphan's Home
within Maryland, since such purpose was ultra vires the pur-
poses of the association."5
POWER OF CHURCH TO SUE
In an action on a claim against estate of decedent who
gave notes to cover the cost of construction of two churches
in India, the Indiana Supreme Court decided that the plain-
tiff was entitled only to the sums which it had actually spent
on the cost of constructing the churches as evidenced by
invoices on building materials which were introduced into
evidence. The further testimony of a witness that the total
cost of the churches was the stated sum agreed to be given
by the decedent was inadmissible as hearsay, since the
evidence was supplied by the Bishop and the witness had
never been to India. 6
34 105 F. 2d 793 (1939).
35 Curtic v. Maryland Baptist Union Association, 5 A. 2d 836 (MD. App.,
1939).
86 De Langes v. Cones, 19 N. E. 2d 850 (Ind., 1939).
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ACTION ON SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT
In passing upon a subscription contract entered into by
decedent the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of
In re McCanna's Estate, Rouech v. St. Jude's Church,'17 was
forced to hold the subscription unenforceable since the con-
tract was accepted only by the Pastor of the Church who
by statute did not have the power to bind the church to the
contract obligations.
POWER OF CHURCH SYNOD OVER CHURCH'S UNIVERSITY
An action for a declaratory judgment was brought in the
case of Synod of Mississippi v. Southwestern,38 to determine
the right of the plaintiff Synod to appoint members to the
Board of Directors of Southwestern Presbyterian University.
From the evidence it appeared that by the unanimous vote
of the-Synods in control of the University the number of
board members to be appointed by each synod was raised
from three to four, and one of such members was required
to be a resident of Memphis. No one of plaintiff's four ap-
pointees was a resident of Memphis and because of this the
court held its appointment had been invalid since the plain-
tiff could not elect to adopt only part of the unanimous rule
by appointing four members but refusing to appoint one of
them from Memphis. It was further held that when once
elected the Synods had no control over the Board of Direc-
tors.
30
POWER OF CHURCH OFFICERS
In addition to the case involving the power of a pastor to
accept a subscription contract on behalf of the church, which
we have already seen,4 ° the courts during the past year have
decided three other cases involving the power of church
officers.
37 284 N. W. 502 (Wis., 1939).
38 122 S. W. 2d 442 (Tenn., 1938).
39 Id., p. 446.
40 Op. cit supra, note 37.
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In the case of Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Lacy,"' the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a judgment for de-
fendants in an action to foreclose an alleged assessment lien
against an unincorporated religious society. From the evi-
dence it appeared that the assessment ordinance was void,
and the certificate issued thereunder was barred by the
statute of limitations when some of the trustees of the so-
ciety executed a renewal certificate, which renewal was void
because it was made without the consent of the society or the
Quarterly Conference of the Church.
Similarly where an alleged agreement to reconvey prem-
ises to plaintiff was entered into between the plaintiff and
one of the officers of the defendant church who was without
authority to bind the church, an action for specific perform-
ance of the agreement could not be maintained.-
Where the evidence showed that the local superior of a
religious order had only limited authority restricted to the
payment of current bills and other necessary expenses the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the order was not
bound by a ten-year insurance contract entered into by the
local superior. 3
CLERGYMAN'S RIGHT TO SEPARATE PROPERTY
In the case of Townley v. Province of the Holy Name,4"
the Federal District Court sitting in California was called
upon to decide a priest's right, as against the right of the
Dominican Order to which he belonged, to property inherit-
ed from his godparents. Canon Law and all the rules of the
Order provided that all the inheritances from other than
blood relatives should pass to the Order, and plaintiff's un-
corroborated conflicting evidence was held insufficient to
41 131 S. W. 2d 698 (TEx. Civ. App., 1939).
42 Neth v. St. John's Reformed Church of Hempfield Township, 6 A. 2d 421
(Pa., 1939).
43 McCarroll Agency, Inc. v. Protectory for Boys Under Care of Franciscan
Brothers of Cincinnati, Ohio, 124 S. W. 2d 816 (Ark., 1939).
44 25 F. Supp. 654 (1938).
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show an intention to vary this clear rule of the Order which
the plaintiff voluntarily embraced.
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF CHURCHES AND CHURCHMEN
A. Contract Liabilities
In the case of Pyzdrowski v. Tarkowski,4 ' a Pennsylvania
Superior Court allowed an action in assumpsit, to recover an
alleged balance due on a contract for the erection of a church
building, from an unincorporated church association. In an
lucid review of the statutory history of actions by and against
churches the court showed that church societies had gradu-
ally been given the right to sue as corporations, and that
the right of action against them as corporations had been
granted although the members of the congregation had been
exempted from liability on all authorized obligations of the
church.
B. Tort Liabilities
In one of the outstanding cases of the year the Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. passed upon the lia-
bility of a church for personal injuries to one not a-member
of its faith which injuries were incurred in leaving a social
hall maintained as an appurtenance to the church. The
plaintiff in the case of Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian
Church,46 was injured when she fell down unlighted stairs
after leaving a Girl Scout meeting in the social hall main-
tained by the defendant church. With one Justice dissenting
the court held that the twenty-four year old plaintiff was
barred by her own assumption of risk or contributory neg-
ligence in attempting to go down the treacherous unlit stair-
way.
In Flores v. De Galvan,47 the second wife of decedent was
allowed to recover substantial damages against a cemetery,
45 137 Pa. Super. 118, 8 A. 2d 458 (1939).
46 123 N.J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d 567, 124 A. L. R. 814 (1939).
47 127 S. W. 2d 305 (TEx. Cirv. Apip., 1939).
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and one of its trustees, the Bishop of San Antonio, for dis-
interring her husband's body and allowing it to be reburied
in a plot owned by the decedent's first wife.
In Van Vliet v. Vander Naald,48 the Michigan Supreme
Court refused to allow a deposed minister of the Reformed
Church of America to recover in a libel action against sev-
eral ministers of said church and the publishers of its offi-
cial paper. It appeared that the plaintiff was deposed on his
confession of having committed adultery with a woman
parishioner and the alleged libel arose out of defendant's
comment upon plaintiff's petition for reinstatement. In hold-
ing for the defendants the court held that the statements
made were qualifiedly privileged and there was no showing
of malice on the part of defendants.
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY CHURCH
Although the acquisition of property by a church is close-
ly aligned with the problem of the powers of churches, which
has already been discussed,. its great importance warrants a
separate treatment of this frequently litigated question.
To avoid a lapse of a legacy to a private mission under a
California statute prohibiting testamentary disposition of
any part of an estate to "Any charitable or benevolent so-
ciety or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust
for charitable uses," when the testator had certain kin 'living
and the will was made within thirty days of his death, the
court held that the mission was not a society or corporation,
and since the property was given it absolutely the bequest
was not defeated by operation of the statute. 9
BEQUESTS FOR MASSES
In the case of Gallagher v. Venturini, ° a New Jersey
Court of Chancery held that although a provision in a will
48 290 Mich. 365, 287 N. W. 564 (1939).
49 In re Steinman's Estate, Steinman v. Scandinavian Faith Mission, 94 P.
2d 821 (CAL. App., 1939). Note the decision did not hold that the mission's acts
were not charitable.
5o 124 N. J. Eq. 538, 3 A. 2d 157 (1938).
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for the saying of Masses for the testator was not in viola-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities, it was void for in-
definiteness because of the will's failure to set up a trust
fund for such purpose.
IDENTITY OF CHURCH WITH THAT NAMED IN
INSURANCE POLICY
In an action on a fire insurance policy the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals refused to hold that plaintiff was precluded
from recovering on the ground the policy was issued to the
"Trustees Pentacostal Church" and the proof showed that
the church was owned by the "Pentacostal Church of Bowie,
Texas," since the defendant failed to show surprise or a
claim of ownership in another.51 Ancillary to the afore-
mentioned'point of law adjudicated in this case was the de-
termination by the court that "occupancy for church pur-
poses," within the meaning of the insurance policy, meant
"that manner of use which ordinarily prudent persons would
make of such building for conducting religious services."
IDENTITY OF CHURCH WITH BENEFICIARY
NAMED IN A WILL
The courts are frequently called upon to identify a bene-
ficiary of a will which is either insufficiently described there-
in or is incapable of accepting the testamentary gift. In at
least six different cases the courts were forced to consider
these problems in relation to religious beneficiaries.
It is the rule in New York that bequests to unincorporated
associations are void, but in keeping with its policy to avoid
a lapse in such a legacy a New York Court in the case of
In re Clendenin's Estate,"2 allowed the parent corporation
of the unincorporated legatee to take a legacy and hold it in
trust for the benefit of the named legatee. To defeat a simi-
51 Republic Underwriters v. Meyer, 127 S. W. 2d 538 (TEx. Civ. App., 1939).
52 9 N. Y. S. 2d 875 (1939).
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lar lapse another court sitting in New York allowed an un-
incorporated religious association of Ohio to take a bequest
of personal property since such was permitted in Ohio, al-
though prohibited in New York.53
The Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of Sacred Heart
Academy of Galveston v. Karsch,54 was forced to construe
the provisions of a nun's holographic will which left about
a millon dollars to "the Blessed Virgin Mary Mother of My
God and my most dear Mother, the Superioress of the Sacred
Heart Convent, Galveston, Texas, for the use and benefit of
the Dominican Sisters, the Community of the Sacred Heart
Convent, Galveston, Texas." From the evidence it appeared
that the community of the "Dominican Sisters of the Sacred
Heart Convent" was not incorporated and, therefore, was
unable to take the bequest, but the "Sacred Heart Academy"
which was operated by such community of sisters, was in-
corporated and was capable of accepting the bequest. The
court held that the Academy was the proper beneficiary of
the bequest which would not lapse because of the improper
designation.
Similarly the courts of California and New Jersey dis-
posed of bequests to non-existent religious societies. The
former court applying the cy pres doctrine to avoid a lapse
in the legacy,55 and the latter court examing extrinsic evi-
dence to discover the true intention of the testator in mak-
ing the bequest.56 The Supreme Court of North Carolina,
bolstered by a liberal construction statute, likewise upheld
a rather indefinite bequest dedicating property to the ad-
vancement of Universalism.57
53 In re Idem's Will, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 970 (1939).
54 122 S. W. 2d 416 (Tenn., 1938).
55 In re Zen's Estate, Los Angeles Orphan's Home Society v. Haas, 91 P. 2d
960 (CAL. APP., 1939).
56 Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America v. Saltmerm, 125 N. J. Eq. 33, 4 A. 2d 69 (1939).
57 Williams v. Williams, 3 S. E. 2d 334 (N. C., 1939).
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ESTATES GRANTED CHURCHES UPON CONDITION
On several occasions within the past year courts were
called upon to construe grants to churches on condition that
the grantee perform, or continue to perform, a named act.
Such conditional grants have long been disfavored by courts
and during 1939 the courts of North Carolina,58 Louisiana,"9
New York,"0 and Alabama 61 evidenced their dislike for such
conditions by holding in effect that the condition is inop-
erative unless express provision is made for reversion of the
estate to the grantor upon the happening of the condition.
Even where express provision was made for a reversion
upon the happening of the condition a New York court
decided that the estate granted would be considered a fee
upon condition subsequent, which required a timely reentry
by the grantor, rather than a base or determinable fee, re-
quiring no reentry to effectuate a reversion.62
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went still further
in holding that even where a condition is established to effect
a reversion the heirs of the grantor had to show a "persistent
and consistent failure" to conform to the condition, and
conduct showing "an utter, wilful disregard of the purposes"
of the grant."
Such a burden of proving nonconformance to a condition
of continuous use of the land for church purposes was not
sustained by a showing that regular church services had not
been held for over a year, when the .evidence showed that
Sunday School classes, Prayer Meetings, and meetings of the
58 Vestry and Legal Trustees of St. Peter's Protestant Episcopal Church of
Washington, N. C., 4 S. E. 2d 328 (N. C., 1939); and Williams v. Thompson, 4
S. E. 2d 609 (N. C., 1939).
50 Board of Trustees of Ruston Circuit, Methodist Episcopal Church, South,
v. Rudy, 187 So. 549 (La., 1939).
60 In re Tubb's Estate, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (1939).
61 Street v. Pitts, 192 So. 258 (Ala., 1939).
62 Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of Fordham v. Valentine, 12 N. Y. S.
2d 989 (1939).
63 In re Patterson's Estate, Appeal of Schrack, 3 A. 2d 320 (Pa., 1939).
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Ladies Aid Society had been held with sufficient continuity
to preclude a claim for reversion of the estate.64
Where a sum was granted to erect a bell tower within ten
years of testator's death the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the delay on the part of the executors of the
estate of the testator's widow in supplying the funds would
not operate to cause the bequest to lapse. 5
ESTOPPEL TO CLAIM REVERSION WHEN CONDITION BROKEN
When it appeared that the plaintiff, in an ejectment action,
bought the property involved from a Baptist Church and
conveyed it to a Jewish Congregation on condition that it
be used forever as an Orthodox Hebrew Synagogue, and at
the instance of the plaintiff the congregation mortgaged the
property to defendant who was ignorant of the condition sub-
sequent, a New Jersey Court of Chancery held the plaintiff
was estopped to bring ejectment and assert his reversionary
interest6'
JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS OVER RELIGIOUS DISPUTES
Courts in Alabama, 7 Michigan, 8 Mississippi," and Mis-
souri 7 ' affirmed the supremacy of church tribunals over ec-
clesiastical questions, and the Missouri Court of Appeals de-
cided that the adminstrative procedure of the church tribu-
nals must be exhausted before an appeal might be made to
the civil courts for relief."'
64 Williams v. Downing, 185 Okla. 633, 95 P. 2d 612 (1939).
65 Miller v. Parish of Epiphany, Winchester, 19 N. E. 2d 46 (Mass-., 1939).
66 Beth Hamedresh Hagodol of Newark v. Isserman, 125 N. J. Eq. 354, 5 A.
2d 786 (1939).
67 Bailey v. Washington, 185 So. 172 (Ala., 1938).
68 Van Vliet v. Vander Naald, 290 Mich. 365, 287 N. W 564 (1939).
69 Grantham v. Humphries, 188 So. 313 (Miss., 1939)
70 Olear v. Haniak, 131 S. W. 2d 375 (Mo., 1939).
71 Id.
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RELIGION IN EDUCATION
In addition to the cases already reviewed which concerned
the mandatory salute of the flag, zoning restrictions, and the
control of a Synod over a University only a few cases have
been decided in 1939 involving religious questions in the
schools.
In an action involving the discharge of a public school
teacher a Pennsylvania court decided among many other
things, that the mere fact a teacher left some of her pupils
unattended while she went -to church on Ascension Thursday
did not sustain a charge of "wilful and persistent negli-
gence." 72
Although such cases strictly do not involve religious issues
the two cases concerning the discharge of teachers upon their
marriage, 3 and the case passing upon the validity of an or-
der making a two-year leave of absence mandatory for all
teacher maternity cases, 4 are mentioned because of their
possible connection with the religious beliefs of some teachers.
James J. Kearney.5
College of Law, Notre Dame University.
72 Horosko v. School District of Mt. Pleasant Township, 4 A. 2d 601 (Pa.
Super., 1939). See also the same case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
6 A. 2d 866 (Pa., 1939).
73 State ex rel. Kundert v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 184 So. 555 (La.,
1938); and Andrews v. Claiborne Parish School Board, 189 So. 355 (La., 1939).
74 Kabatt v. Graves, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 728 (1930).
75 I wish to acknowledge the assistance rendered by, Mr. Leon L. Lancaster,
graduating senior of the College of Law of the University of Notre Dame.
